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EVIDENCE LAW

IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES:
APPLICATION OF SOUTH CAROLINA

RULES OF EVIDENCE 608(b) AND 609(a)(2)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1997 the South Carolina Court ofAppeals examined two cases involving the
use of prior convictions in the impeachment ofwitnesses. In State v. Shaw' the court
held that a prior conviction of shoplifting fell within the meaning of "dishonesty or
false statement" under Rule 609(a)(2) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence.' In
State v. Joseph,3 a case that the trial court decided in 1995 before the adoption of
the South Carolina Rules of Evidence, the appellate court ruled that the State could
not impeach the defendant's witness with information about an earlier charge of
possession of cocaine because the witness successfully completed the Pretrial
Intervention Program (PTI) for that offense. However, the court did not resolve the
more difficult question of "whether successful completion of the PTI program

prohibits impeachment of the witness with the conduct giving rise to the PTI
involvement."'
This Note examines the practice of impeaching witnesses with prior convictions
after the adoption of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. Part II discusses prior
convictions, comparing Rule 609(a)(2) to the common law. Part III analyzes
whether the completion of a PTI program constitutes a conviction under Rule
609(a). Part IV then explains the limitations and advantages of using Rule 608(b),
rather than Rule 609(a), and what conduct falls under Rule 608(b). In conclusion,
this Note summarizes the effect the South Carolina Rules of Evidence have on the
impeachment of witnesses either by prior conviction or by prior bad conduct.

1. 328 S.C. 454, 492 S.E.2d 402 (Ct. App. 1997).
2. Id.at 456-57, 492 S.E.2d at 403-04. Rule 609(a)(2) states that "evidence that any witness has
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of
the punishment." S.C. R. EvtD. 609(a)(2).
3. 328 S.C. 352, 491 S.E.2d 275 (Ct. App. 1997).
4. Id. at 359, 491 S.E.2d at 278; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-22-10 to -170 (Law. Co-op. 1976 &
Supp. 1997). The PTI program is an alternative, noncriminal disposition of certain criminal charges.
To participate in PTI, the offender must satisfy statutory requirements and must agree to the terms and
conditions of the intervention program. Upon the successful completion of the program, the solicitor
may dispose of the pending criminal charges. Id.
5. Joseph, 328 S.C. at 358, 491 S.E.2d at 278.
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IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION

In State v. Shaw the court of appeals ruled that the State could cross-examine
a defendant about an earlier shoplifting conviction.6 Concluding that shoplifting was
a crime involving dishonesty per se, the court of appeals held that the conviction
was admissible under Rule 609(a)(2).7 While recognizing "that some federal courts
have held [that] a defendant may not be impeached on a prior shoplifting
conviction,"' the court refused to align itself with those courts.' According to the
court, common sense reveals that shoplifters act dishonestly when they take
merchandise with no intent to pay. l" Thus, the court broadly interpreted the term
"dishonesty."
A. South CarolinaEvidence Law Priorto the 1995 Adoption of the Rules
ofEvidence
To more fully understand the significance of Shaw and the court's reasoning,
it is helpful to briefly examine South Carolina evidence law prior to the 1995
adoption of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. South Carolina evidence law
developed from English and early American common-law decisions." Traditionally,
only crimes involving dishonesty could be used to impeach witnesses.'" "[T]o be
competent in evidence the former crime of the witness must have involved moral
delinquency and tended to show that his character is such as to render his testimony
unworthy of belief."'" In Gantt v. Columbia Coca-ColaBottling Co.'4 the court
added a new twist, holding that illicit liquor distribution embodied the "moral
delinquency" that "would affect awitness' [s] believability if it were not 'too remote
in time.""... More recent cases have concluded that previous crimes are not
admissible for impeachment purposes unless they involve moral turpitude.'"
However, the determination of what constituted a crime of moral turpitude often

6. Shaw, 328 S.C. at 457, 492 S.E.2d at 404.
7. Id. at 456-57, 492 S.E.2d at 403-04.
8. Id. at 456, 492 S.E.2d at 403.
9. Id. (citing United States v. Amaechi, 991 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1993); McHenry v. Chadwick, 896
F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Scisney, 885 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Ashley, 569 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dorsey, 591 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
10. Id. at 457, 492 S.E.2d at 404.
11. E. WARREN MOISE, IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE 4 (1996).
12. JAMES F. DREHER & JON P. THAMES, A GUIDE TO EVIDENCE LAW INSOUT CAROLINA 30
(1979).
13. State v. Chasteen, 231 S.C. 141, 145, 97 S.E.2d 517, 519 (1957).
14. 204 S.C. 374,29 S.E.2d 488 (1944).
15. DREHER &THAMES, supra note 12, at 30 (quoting Gantt,231 S.C. at 379,29 S.E.2d at 48990).
16. See, e.g., State v. Millings, 247 S.C. 52, 53, 145 S.E.2d 422, 423 (1965) (holding auto theft
to be a crime of moral turpitude); State v. Savage, 306 S.C. 5, 8,409 S.E.2d 809, 811 (Ct. App. 1991)
(holding possession of marijuana with intent to distribute to be a crime of moral turpitude).
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perplexed the courts.'" The South Carolina Supreme Court defines "[a] crime
involving moral turpitude [as] an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man or to society in general,
contrary to the customary and accepted rule of right and duty between man and
man." s South Carolina courts have concluded that various types of crimes fall
within this definition, 9 while others do not.2" As the supreme court noted in State
v. LaBarge,2' "all crimes involve some degree of social irresponsibility, [but] all
crimes do not involve moral turpitude." "Most offenses found to involve moral
turpitude... seem to include some type of dishonest behavior,"' although courts
have found crimes that do not necessarily involve dishonesty to be crimes of moral

turpitude.24 Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude was not necessarily

admissible as evidence;25 instead, the trial judge had discretion to decide if the
prejudicial effect of admitting awitness's prior conviction outweighed the probative
value of such evidence.26
B. Impeachment Under Rule 609(a)(2)

The adoption of Rule 609 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence altered the
admissibility of some types of convictions previously used to impeach witnesses.2 7

17. DREHER & THAMES, supranote 12, at 30.
18. State v. Perry, 294 S.C. 311, 312, 364 S.E.2d 201, 202 (1988).
19. See, e.g., State v. Major, 301 S.C. 181, 184, 391 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1990) (possession of
cocaine); State v. Harrison, 298 S.C. 333,336,380 S.E.2d 818, 819 (1989) (fraudulent checks); Perry,
294 S.C. at 312, 364 S.E.2d at 202 (malicious destruction of personal property); State v. Harris, 293
S.C. 75, 76, 358 S.E.2d 713,714 (1987) ("Peeping Tom" offenses); Rouse v. McCrory, 291 S.C. 218,
220,353 S.E.2d 130, 131 (1986) (breaking into motorvehicle); State v. Yates, 280 S.C. 29,36-37,310
S.E.2d 805, 809-10 (1982) (arson and larceny); Millings,247 S.C. at 53,145 S.E.2d at423 (auto theft);
State v. Van Williams, 212 S.C. 110, 114,46 S.E.2d 665, 667 (1948) (housebreaking, larceny, and
grand larceny); Savage, 306 S.C. at 8, 409 S.E.2d at 811 (possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute).
20. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 298 S.C. 186, 189, 379 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1989) (manslaughter);
State v. Morris, 289 S.C. 294, 297, 345 S.E.2d 477, 478 (1986) (bookmaking); State v. Bailey, 275
S.C. 444, 446,272 S.E.2d 439,440 (1980) (assault and battery of ahigh and aggravated nature); State
v. Harvey, 275 S.C. 225, 227,268 S.E.2d 587, 588 (1980) (simple possession of marijuana).
21. 275 S.C. 168, 268 S.E.2d 278 (1980).
22. Id. at 172, 268 S.E.2d at 280.
23. WILLIAM SHEPARD McANINCH & W. GASTON FAIREY, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SouTH
CAROLINA 45 (3d ed. 1996).
24. See, e.g., Major,301 S.C. at 184,391 S.E.2d at 237 (possession of cocaine); State v. Horton,
271 S.C. 413, 415, 248 S.E.2d 263, 264 (1978) (hit-and-run offense).
25. See Merritt v. Grant, 285 S.C. 150, 156-57, 328 S.E.2d 346, 350 (Ct. App. 1985).
26. Id.; see S.C. R. EVID. 403.
27. Rule 609(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence provides as follows:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was
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Since the adoption ofRule 609, courts no longer need to decide whether a crime is
one of moral turpitude. Instead, courts must determine whether a conviction falls
within one of the two categories of Rule 609(a). Under Rule 609(a)(1), crimes
punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year or by death can be admitted for
impeachment purposes if the judge determines that its probative value substantially
outweighs its danger of unfair prejudice to the accused.28 Under Rule 609(a)(2),
crimes involving dishonesty or false statements shall be admitted regardless of the
danger of unfair prejudice.29 Because of Rule 609(a), some crimes historically
admissible to impeach a witness will now be inadmissible, and some which were
inadmissible are now admissible.
Whether or not a crime is one of dishonesty or false statement under Rule
609(a)(2) is, like the older moral turpitude standard, open to varying interpretations.
A "crime involving dishonesty" may be broadly interpreted to mean a crime
involving 'breach of honesty or trust, [such] as lying, deceiving, cheating, stealing,
or defrauding,""'3 or the term can be narrowly interpreted to mean a crime involving
fraud or deceit.3 Thus, whether a prior conviction will be admissible under Rule
609(a)(2) depends upon which interpretation the court adopts. If a crime is viewed
as one involving dishonesty, then the court must admit the prior conviction because,
under subsection (a)(2), prior convictions involving dishonesty or false statement
must be admitted regardless of their probative value or prejudicial effect 2 Prior to
the adoption of the rules, the court had discretion over the admissibility of all prior
convictions.33 Now the court's discretion is limited to crimes falling under Rule
34
609(a)(1).
C. StatutoryHistoryandlnterpretationofFederalRuleofEvidence 609(a)(2)
Because Rule 609 of the South Carolina and Federal Rules of Evidence are

convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall
be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted ifit involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless ofthe punishment.
For the purposes of this rule, a conviction includes a conviction resulting
from a trial or any type of plea, including a plea of nolo contendere or a plea
pursuant to North Carolinav. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
S.C. R. EVID. 609(a). South Carolina's Rule 609(a) "is identical to the federal rule except for the
addition of the last sentence." S.C. R. EvID. 609 Note.
28. S.C. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
29. S.C. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
30. See United States v. Brackeen, 969 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcrIoNARY 650 (unabridged ed. 1986)).
31. Id.
32. S.C. R. EviD. 609(a)(2).
33. See supraPart II.A.
34. S.C. R.EVID. 609(a)(1).
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almost identical," it may be helpful to consider the statutory history of the federal
rule. The floor debate in the U.S. House of Representatives over Rule 609(a) far
exceeded the debate of "any other provision of the Evidence Rules. 36 The Senate
Judiciary Committee Report explained that the phrase "dishonesty and false
statement" was to mean "crimes such as perjury or subornation of perjury, false
statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement or false pretense, or any other offense, in
the nature of crimen falsi the commission of which involves some element of
untruthfulness, deceit or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to testify
' The House
truthfully."37
Conference Committee Report basically adopted the
Senate's terminology.38 Since the 1975 adoption of the Federal Rules, the
overwhelming majority of federal court cases decided have adopted this narrow
definition of dishonesty and have not held crimes such as shoplifting and larceny
to be crimes of dishonesty.39
D. State Courts'Interpretationof Rule 609(a)(2)
States that have adopted some form ofthe federal rules have also struggled with
defining the crimes that fall within Rule 609(a)(2). For example, the Washington
Supreme Court in State v. Burton0 accepted the narrow definition espoused by the
congressional conference committees and found that crimes of "'dishonesty'
include only those crimes which contain elements in the nature of crimenfalsiand
which bear directlyon a defendant's propensity for truthfulness."4 ' However, many
other state courts have ruled that crimes involving theft and shoplifting may be
admissible as crimes involving dishonesty or false statement.42
E. South Carolina'sInterpretationofRule 609(a)(2)
In State v. Shaw the court of appeals aligned itself with those jurisdictions that
have taken a broad view of dishonesty and held that shoplifting involved dishonesty

35. See supranote 29.
36. 28 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 6131, at 154 (1993).
37. S. REP. No. 93-1277 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7061.
38. H.R. CONF. REP.No. 93-1597 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7103.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Grandmont, 680 F.2d 867, 871 (1st Cir. 1982) (robberies
inadmissible); United States v. Cunningham, 638 F.2d 696, 699 (4th Cir. 1981) (passing worthless
checks inadmissible); United States v. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975, 979 (5th Cir. 1978) (shoplifting
inadmissible); United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188, 191 (10th Cir. 1978) (burglary inadmissible);
United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (attempted robbery inadmissible).
40. 676 P.2d 975 (Wash. 1984).
41. Id. at 980.
42. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 592 N.E.2d 217, 221 (111.App. Ct. 1992) (holding that
misdemeanor theft is a crime of dishonesty); People v. Courtney, 542 N.E.2d 116, 118 (I11. App. Ct.
1989) (ruling convictions for robbery and Credit Card Act violations involved dishonesty); State v.
Grover, 518 A.2d 1039, 1040 (Me. 1986) (finding prior conviction of theft admissible).
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per se.43 In so holding, the court relied on Webster's definition of "dishonesty" to
mean deceiving or stealing.44 The court's broad interpretation will increase the

number of witnesses impeached by their prior convictions because any crime that

is determined to involve dishonesty can automatically be used for impeachment
purposes regardless of prejudicial effect.4 As a result, South Carolina courts may
admit evidence ofcriminal convictions for crimes tangentially related to dishonesty.
Such a result appears contrary to Congress's intent when it adopted Rule 60946 and
could prove to negatively impact the rights of the accused.
III. THE PRETRIAL INTERVENTION PROGRAM AND IMPEACHMENT

In 1997 the South Carolina Court of Appeals also considered whether the
successful completion of a PTI program should be deemed a conviction for
impeachment purposes.4" In State v. Josephthe court held that a prosecution witness

could not be impeached by evidence of a witness's successful completion of a PTI
program because participation in the program is not considered a conviction.48 The
court reasoned that statutory "provisions for expungement and confidentiality of the
arrest reflect a legislative policy decision" that an offender who participates in a PTI
program should "be given a fresh start, free from the stigma of a criminal
' The court opined that "upon successful completion of the PTI
conviction."49
program, it is as if the arrest never occurred-the offender is not required to admit
to the arrest and the offender's denial of the arrest is, by statute, deemed to be
truthful."5 The Joseph decision is in accord with Rule 609(c),5' which states that
if a "conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of
rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation
of the person convicted," evidence of the conviction is not admissible for

43. 328 S.C. 454, 456-57, 492 S.E.2d 402,403-04 (Ct. App. 1997).
44. Id. at 457, 492 S.E.2d at 404.
45. S.C. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
46. See supranotes 37-39 and accompanying text.
47. Two Florida cases have also considered whether evidence of participation in a PTI program
can be used to impeach a witness. In Coolen v. State, 696 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1997), the Florida Supreme
Court found no error in the trial court's refusal to allow a witness to be cross-examined about a charge
of sexual battery when the witness had entered a PTI program. Id. at 743. However, the trial court did
allow counsel to disclose that the witness "was charged with a felony... and that she was currently
on PTI, but did not allow counsel to reach the nature of the felony or the facts involved." Id.
In West v. State, 503 So. 2d 435 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), the Florida appellate court upheld the
trial court's denial of the cross-examination of a witness concerning his previous participation in a
juvenile PTI program. Id. at 436.
48. 328 S.C. 352, 358, 491 S.E.2d 275, 278 (Ct. App. 1997). Because this case was decided by
the trial court prior to the adoption of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence, the moral turpitude
standard was appropriate.
49. Id. at 359, 491 S.E.2d at 279.
50. Id. at 359, 491 S.E.2d at 278.
51. S.C.R.EvID. 609(c).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss5/10

6

1998]

et al.: Evidence Law
EVIDENCE LAW

1189

impeachment purposes." Moreover, the court's reasoning is also consistent with a
1988 South Carolina Attorney General opinion which stated that no conviction
occurs when an offender successfully completes a pretrial intervention pfogran."
IV. IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR BAD ACTS
A. Rule 608(b)
A witness's credibility can be impeached by prior bad acts even if these acts did
not result in a conviction. 4 Rule 608(b)" ofthe South Carolina Rules of Evidence
authorizes the admissibility ofa witness's prior conduct in specific instances. 6 The
court in Joseph discussed, but did not decide, whether the conduct leading up to the
witness's arrest could be introduced to attack the witness's credibility. 7 Realizing
that protecting both the arrest and the conduct from inquiry would be unfair if it
prevented a party from using information that could affect the witness's
credibility,58 the court suggested that "[a]llowing impeachment through a carefully
worded question about the underlying conduct, but not the arrest, would ensure that
all litigants are able to present all relevant information to the jury."' 9 However,
because the issue was not preserved for appeal, the court did not have to resolve the
question.6"
B. The RelationshipBetween Rule 608(b) andRule 609(a)(2)
South Carolina has yet to resolve how Rule 608(b) relates to Rule 609(a) when
the prior bad act results in a conviction. Because Rule 608(b) excepts a "conviction
of [a] crime as provided in Rule 609,"6I Rule 608 can be read narrowly, allowing

52. Id.
53. See 1988 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. No. 88-78, at 223.

54. S.C. R. EvID. 608(b).
55. Rule 608(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence provides:
[S]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in
Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the
discretion of the court, if probative oftruthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired
into on cross-examination ofthe witness (1) concerning the witness' character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being crossexamined has testified.

Id.
56. Id.
57. State v. Joseph, 328 S.C. 352, 360, 491 S.E.2d 275, 279 _(Ct. App. 1997).

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. S.C. R.EVID. 608(b).
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only the admission of prior bad acts that do not result in a conviction. 2 However,
a broader reading of this exemption language would exempt only proof of a prior
conviction from the ban on extrinsic evidence. 3 Although the conviction itself
could not be admitted, this broader instruction would allow the cross-examination
of a witness about any dishonest conduct, even if that conduct resulted in a
conviction.' If South Carolina courts adopt this more liberal interpretation, lawyers
could elicit more information regarding prior conduct using Rule 608(b) than is
allowed under Rule 609(a)(2). "Rule 609[(a)(2)] provides quite clearly that only the
fact of conviction is admissible for impeachment. Rule 608(b), however, provides
that specific instances of conduct, probative of 'truthfulness or untruthfulness' may
be 'inquired into on cross-examination' of the impeached witness."65 Can the crossexaminer avoid the limits contained in Rule 609 by invoking Rule 608(b) instead?
This strategy would also avoid Rule 609(b)'s ten-year limitation period 6 and Rule
609(c)'s ban on questions about convictions that have generated pardons or
annulments.67
V. CONCLUSION

South Carolina courts have not yet decided whether Rule 608(b) can be used
to inquire into conduct that results in convictions. Perhaps courts could offer the
cross-examiner a choice-either proceed under Rule 608(b) by asking about the
underlying acts without mentioning the convictions, or proceed under Rule 609(a)
and be limited to the conviction itself. Although Rule 608(b) seems preferable
because the question may elicit more information, the judge has the discretion to
allow or disallow this evidence. Under Rule 609(a)(2), however, a crime involving

dishonesty or false statement will automatically be admissible. South Carolina
courts will likely continue to interpret crimes involving dishonesty and false
statement broadly so that more crimes are automatically admitted for impeachment
purposes. Although the new rules of evidence supersede the moral turpitude
standard of the common law, South Carolina courts may continue to look to the

62. See H. Richard Uviller, Essay, Credence, Character,and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing
Through the Liar'sTale, 42 DUKEL.J. 776,804 (1993) (examining the relationship between rules 608
and 609). Although this article discusses the federal rules of evidence, the South Carolina rules are
substantively similar.
63. S.C. R. EviD. 608(b).
64. Uviller, supranote 64, at 805.
65. Id. at 804 (quoting FED. R EVID. 608(b)).
66. S.C. R. EVID. 609(b). This section provides that evidence of a conviction is not admissible
if "more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or ofthe release of the witness from
the confinement, ... whichever is the later date." Id.However, the court can make an exception if "the
probative value of the conviction ... substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect." Id.
67. S.C. R. EVID. 609(c). This section provides that "[e]vidence of a conviction is not admissible
[if] the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, [or] certificate of rehabilitation."
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common law for guidance in their interpretation of the dishonesty and false
statement standard of Rule 609(a)(2). As a result, many crimes may be
automatically admitted even if only tangentially related to dishonesty.
Debbie N. Whittle
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